The Future of Chinese Markets by Huang, Flora
 
81 
 
 
The Future of Chinese Capital Markets 
Dr. Flora Huang528 
 
Abstract 
In 2015 China’s State Council approved to shift to a US style registration system for stock 
market flotations. The new registration system replaces the current IPO approval which has 
been criticised for its complexity and strict requirements. Meanwhile, China has created a 
more-favourable environment to attract the relisting of Chinese technology companies listed 
overseas and enable mutual market access between the mainland and Hong Kong via a ‘Stock 
Connect’ link, opening Chinese equity markets to international investors.  The paper aims to 
analyse the recent stock market reforms in China and how such changes affect the future of 
Chinese capital markets. It covers the recent IPO reform and the new initiatives to attract 
Chinese technology companies to list or relist domestically, as well the internationalisation of 
Chinese capital markets.  
 
1. Introduction 
China’s capital markets have gone through nearly 40-year development since the introduction 
of the reform and opening-up policy. Chinese stock markets were not initially an attractive 
financing option for most private Chinese enterprises. The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) were established in the 1990s as arms of the central 
government to solve the capital shortages problems of state-owned enterprise (SOEs) and sell 
shares to outside investors thereby raising the value of the government’s stake in these 
companies.529 In recent years, however, Chinese domestic stock exchanges have started to 
become more competitive in the face of overseas stock exchanges which have historically 
dominated world-wide capital markets. In 2009 China became the world’s biggest source of 
companies going public, both in number and value terms. 183 Chinese initial public offerings 
(IPOs) raised more than $55 billion, compared with $24 billion raised by US IPOs.530 In 
September 2016 the stock exchanges of Shanghai, Hong Kong and Shenzhen ranked globally 
4th, 7th and 8th, respectively.531 China’s capital markets have become a dynamic component of 
China’s financial system and one of the major driving forces behind economic and social 
reforms.532  
 
The Chinese regulators place a greater emphasis on maintaining the stability of capital 
markets by intervening and reasserting control of the markets through the ‘national team’. But 
people cast doubt on the effects of such intervention as policies pursued by the government in 
search of new sources of growth are at least partly to blame for the creation of the bubble that 
burst in the summer of 2015.533 Even worse, on 7 January 2016, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) suspended new stock market rules after only four days because they were 
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fuelling sharp trading losses.534 China’s dramatic and short-lived experience with market 
circuit breakers has revived debate about whether existing financial systems in China are able 
to accommodate the growth of capital markets so as to support a sustainable economy.  
 
Despite some unsatisfied government intervention in markets, China has determined to 
reform its capital markets which is embedded in the national policy. A pledge to allow the 
‘market to play a decisive role’ in economy in the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist 
Party’s 18th Congress in 2013 has been seen as a major innovation in China's stock market.535 
It helps to accelerate the development of direct financing and to provide investors with more 
diversified investment channels.536 One year later, the State Council promulgated the Opinions 
on the Sound Development of Capital Markets, which was instrumental in providing a 
roadmap and guideline regarding to capital market development for the next 5 - 10 years in 
the ‘new normal’ phase.537 The Opinions stated the development of capital markets had to be 
centred around economic needs. It set up a framework for multi-layered capital markets, and 
laid out the principles and direction of registration-based IPO reform. 
 
This article aims to provide a comprehensive review of the recent regulatory reforms and the 
implications for the future evolution of Chinese capital markets. After this introduction, it is 
divided into five sections, covering the recent IPO reform and the new initiatives to attract 
Chinese technology companies listed or relisted domestically, as well the internationalisation 
of Chinese capital markets.  
 
2. From a Merit-based Regulation towards a Disclosure-based 
Regulation  
Internationally, there are two main approaches to regulate securities offerings, the first of 
which is disclosure-based (also known as the registration system) and the other merits-based 
(also known as the approval system). The disclose-based model, adopted by most advanced 
economies like the US, UK, Australia and Hong Kong, requires adequate disclosure with 
respect to the transaction and imposing sanctions for false or misleading statements. By 
contrast, under the merit-based model, the regulatory authorities seek to protect the investor 
from abuse and ensure that the securities are offered to them at a fair price by intervening 
substantively in the offering process.538 The public offering and listing, cannot proceed until 
the securities have been ‘approved’ by the authority, which is employed by China, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
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In the view of Leng, However, there is no huge difference between the two systems except 
regulatory resources.539 Both systems concern the principle of mandatory information 
disclosure as the prerequisite for a public listing of securities and the information on the 
issuer’s ability to make continuing profits and the risk factors in the prospectus. The main 
differences of the two systems lie in the input of regulatory resources. The regulators in the US 
and UK only conduct a very limited review of intending issuers’ substantive credentials and 
focus on a close examination of disclosure in the prospectus and imposition of liability ex-post. 
Upon approval, intending issuers can decide when to enter the IPO market, leaving the market 
to decide the size of the offering and the level of the offering price. 
 
In China, before the merit-based approval system, the quota system had been operated since 
1993 with the intention of curbing the potential excessive investment demand in a premature 
market. The CSRC would review each listing of applicant and channel the funds to important 
SOE sectors such as energy, natural resources, manufacturing and heavy industry. However, 
the quota system was replaced by an approval system in 2001 owing to the heavy criticism on 
its manipulation of market sentiment and the vulnerability of corruption.540  
 
Article 10(1) of China’s Securities Law 2014541 empowers the CSRC to conduct substantial 
examination of the efficacy or equity of the proposed offerings. A public issuance of securities 
shall meet the requirements prescribed in laws and administrative regulations and shall be 
reported to the CSRC under the State Council or the department authorised by the State 
Council for verification and approval according to law. Without any examination and approval 
according to law, no entity or individual may make a public issuance of any securities.542 The 
Securities Law then sets out substantive approval requirements for public offerings.543 The 
CSRC distinguishes IPO and subsequent offerings when it comes to the substantial criterial of 
review and approval. Specifically, IPO is governed by the Measures for the Administration of 
Initial Public Offering and Listing of Stocks and the subsequent offerings are regulated by the 
Measures for Securities Offerings by Listed Companies. The application documents are 
subject to the review and examination of the Public Offering Review Committee, which 
comprises both the CSRC staff and external experts. The Committee members vote by majority 
when recommending to the CSRC for a public offering.544 Taking into consideration of the 
recommendation of the Committee, the CSRC finally decides whether or not to approve a 
public offering. 
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The operation of the merit-based system has long been criticised as one of the fundamental 
deficiencies in China’s stock market.545 Merit review and approval essentially represented a 
form of state ‘paternalism’ in which they replace investors’ value judgement with those of the 
securities regulators.546 They ‘unnecessary constrain’ the freedom of entrepreneurs and impede 
the flow of capital to its most efficient use.547  Therefore, China follows the word-wide trend, in 
particular in the Asia-pacific region such as Japan, Malaysia and Singapore, to move from a 
merit-based approach to a disclosure-based one to regulate the issuers.548 
 
After the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee, the CSRC incorporated the 
decision of the Committee into its Opinions on Further Developing IPO System Reform.549 
And then the State Council published a new guideline (New Nine Measures) setting various 
capital market reform goals with placed the IPO registration system at the top of its agenda.550 
In December 2015 China’s State Council approved to shift to a US-style registration system for 
stock market flotations, removing a stumbling block that has distorted supply and demand, 
and artificially inflated valuations of new stock offerings.551  
 
The new registration system replaces the current IPO approval process by the CSRC, which 
has been criticised for its complexity and strict requirements. The changes are expected to help 
companies raise money more efficiently and reduce the involvement of regulators in the 
capital market.552 But the State Council announced that the stock exchanges had to wait for at 
least two years to adopt the new registration system for IPOs, after receiving approval from 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.553 The CSRC also responded that 
the reform would be gradual and would not lead to a big increase in the number of IPOs. 
 
3. Keep Chinese Technology Companies to Stay Home 
With many premium technology companies, such as Alibaba, Sohu, Baidu and Youku listing 
overseas particularly in the US, Chinese regulators are compelled to provide more-favourable 
regulations to attract their listing or relisting on domestic markets. They also point to the 
stunning success of companies such as Beijing Baofeng Technology Company, whose shares 
have skyrocketed more than 3,600% since listing in China in March 2015.554  
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However, the biggest barrier to keep the internet and innovation companies listed 
domestically is regulatory rules which ban significant foreign ownership of such companies. 
The Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries555 classifies industries in 
which foreign investment is encouraged, restricted or prohibited. In order to get around these 
restrictions or prohibitions, Chinese companies often use ‘Variable Interest Entity’ (VIE), 
allowing them to acquire foreign capital despite a ban on foreign investment in the relevant 
sectors.  The term of VIE is initially used by the US Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) in FIN 46556 to refer to an entity in which the investor holds a controlling interest that 
is not based on the majority of voting rights. The US General Accepted Accounting Principles 
require the reporting entity to consolidate the financials of the VIE after the Enron scandal, 
provided that the reporting entity is a primary beneficiary of the VIE. This type of legislation 
in the US intends to prevent the off-balance-sheet liabilities hidden in the reporting company's 
special purpose entities (SPE) from going undetected and causing systemic risks.557 
 
Under a typical VIE Structure (see Figure 1), the foreign investor will establish jointly with a 
domestic partner (PRC Founders) an offshore entity (ListCo) to directly or indirectly own a 
wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) or similar Foreign-invested Enterprise (FIE) in 
China. This foreign-controlled WFOE (or FIE) has control over the ownership and 
management of a domestic licensed company that holds the necessary license(s) to operate in 
a sector where FDI is restricted or prohibited (the ‘Domestic Licensed Co’, also commonly 
referred to as the VIE. 
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Financial crisis.  
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Figure 1 – Typical VIE Structure 
 
 
 
Source: Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, ‘Understanding the VIE Structure: Necessary Elements 
for Success and the Legal Risks Involved’ (2011). 
 
 
The VIE has been used in China to serve two purposes: firstly, to circumvent restrictions on 
foreign investment in specific industries; secondly, to restructure a ‘round-trip investment’ by 
using a controlled offshore company to acquire the affiliated domestic enterprise. The ‘round-
trip investment’ is defined as direct investment activities carried out within China by a Chinese 
domestic resident directly or indirectly via a special vehicle purpose.558 This broad definition 
apparently includes round-trip investments by way of VIE structures. Motives for China’s 
round-trip investment are not only tax advantages and fiscal incentives, but also related to the 
safety and risk management of capital.559 Although the China’s State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE) has agreed to register the SPV and its round-trip investment (i.e., 
establishment of the WFOE) since 2014, the SAFE makes clear that it shall not be deemed to 
have endorsed the legality of VIE560 The SAFE’s Circular 37 is a required registration 
application that allows the Chinese government to regulate many of the shareholding 
arrangements, foreign currency flows, and tax issues associated with VIE structures and 
round-trip Investments.  
 
                                               
558 The Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Relevant Issues Concerning Foreign Exchange 
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rpb10.pdf> accessed 22 November 2016. 
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The VIE structure not only exacerbates the agency costs within the company,561  but also may 
pose a substantial risk to foreign investors as it is technically illegal under Chinese law.562 In 
July 2006, the China’s Ministry of Information and Industry enacted the Circular on 
Strengthening the Administration of Foreign Investment in Operating Value-added 
Telecommunication Business, which provides that domestic telecom companies are not 
allowed to lease, transfer, or sell licences relating to the telecom business to foreign 
investors.563 In the same year, the Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the M&A Rules) in 2006 require central government 
approvals from the China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the CSRC for cross-border 
acquisitions of Chinese assets or equity.564 Following the 2006 M&A Rules, it became necessary 
to set up an offshore entity and WFOE prior to any onshore acquisition. Failure to set up the 
aforementioned entities in the correct order risks violating the 2006 M&A Rules.  
 
The recent arbitration and judiciary decisions also have significantly deepened the worries 
concerning the legality of VIEs. In 2010-2013 the VIE agreements were void by the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission and the Supreme People’s Court 
on the grounds that they violated Chinese law that prohibits foreign investors from controlling 
and participating in the FDI restricted business and constituted ‘concealing illegal intentions 
with a lawful form’.565 
 
Recently the new drafted Foreign Investment Law (FIL) marks a significant move to relax its 
regulation on foreign investment with a particular focus on VIEs, which is currently under 
consideration and is submitted to the National People’s Congress this year for approval.566 The 
draft FIL proposes to replace the absolute restrictions and prohibitions on investment in 
certain industries with a new rule allowing foreigners to invest in such industries as long as 
businesses are majority-owned by Chinese citizens. It means that the VIE structure will no 
longer be needed for foreign investors to invest in a company within a restricted or prohibited 
industry, as long as they do not take a controlling position in the company. But the existing 
VIE structure may not be automatically grandfathered until the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) reviews existing VIE structures and validates as appropriate. 
 
However, concerns remain over the level of the Chinese government’s intervention in the 
review process.567 One the one hand, the government are opening up and relaxing the approval 
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<http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/announcement/201003/20100306819130.shtml> accessed at 15 
November 2016. 
565 Wong, Gillian and Osawa, Juro, ‘How China’s New Foreign Investment Rules Might Play Out’, Wall Street Journal, 22 January 
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at: <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ag/201501/20150100871007.shtml> accessed 20 November 2016.  
567 Russell, Chris, ‘Rules of the Game: Changes in China’s Foreign Investment Law’, CKGSB Knowledge, 25 June 2015, available 
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requirements for foreign investment generally, but on the other hand they are strengthening 
their ability to intervene, for example through the national security review. The draft FIL 
provides that any foreign investment that gives rise to or could give rise to national security 
concerns will be subject to a national security review. The result of a review would not be 
subject to any administrative or judicial review. This is significantly broader than the scope of 
China’s existing rules in this area where a review is required only where the investment is in 
certain sensitive sectors or locations and involves certain types of transactions. This new 
broader ambit would add uncertainty into new investment projects as investors would not 
know for sure whether or not the additional time and cost of a national security review process 
will need to be factored into their establishment process.568 It also gives rise to concerns that 
the discretion to require a national security review will be exercised for purely political 
reasons. 
 
4. China’s Stock Exchanges – Compete and Connect 
To further encourage the relisting of overseas-traded Chinese companies on domestic 
markets, China announced to create the Strategic Emerging Industries Board in the SHSE in 
2015 to give the green light to innovative companies. But it will be formally established after 
China formally switches its approval system for IPOs to allow corporate leaders and market 
conditions, rather than regulators, to determine the size and timing of IPOs. The new board is 
considering more relaxed criteria, such as waiving requirements on revenue and allowing 
unprofitable applicants listing.569 It will also host companies in sectors favoured by China for 
building an innovation-driven economy, including computer science, information technology, 
renewable energy and bioscience.  
 
However, Shanghai new board will face challenges in positioning itself to compete for the pie 
of emerging industries, not only with overseas exchanges such as the New York Stock 
Exchange and Nasdaq, but also with China’s own exchanges. The SZSE established the Small 
and Medium Enterprise (SME) board to lower the entry barriers for enterprises in relatively 
mature stage of development in 2004, and its own Nasdaq style of ChiNext for innovative 
growth enterprises in 2009.570 In May 2016 the Shenzhen’s SME board for mostly non-state 
companies first took over Shanghai - China’s oldest bourse as the top of turnover rakings for 
China’s four major trading venues.571 The ChiNext now had 809 listed companies in November 
2016, and the turnover is almost as high as those in the main board at over RMB100 billion a 
day.572 
 
Then the Chinese National Equities Exchange and Quotations (NEEQ) in Beijing, a market 
generally referred to as the new third board, was designed for the transfer of stakes in unlisted 
companies and other over-the-counter transactions in 2012. It had 9,723 companies including 
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many technology, biochemical and new industry stocks in November 2016.573 In terms of the 
number of listings, it has more than the combined number of 3,000 companies listed in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen in the same period. 
 
Hong Kong launched the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) in 1999 to provide a fund-raising 
venue for technology industries. But its track record is not so great as it can only attract 250 
companies to list compared with the 1,703 companies listed on the main board, as of 23 
November 2016.574 The turnover and market cap of the GEM accounted for about 1 per cent of 
the main board. The problem of the GEM is that its threshold is too high for new start-ups 
while most up and running companies would prefer to wait by producing a profit so they can 
list on the main board which enjoys a higher turnover and a better reputation.575 For Hong 
Kong, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) chairman Carlson Tong Ka-shing said 
earlier they would review the GEM and other listing rules regime to make improvements. How 
to revamp the GEM and to let the city to compete with Shanghai’s new board will definitely be 
something on the agenda. 
 
While Chinese stock exchanges compete for the top venue for listings, they have worked 
intensively via the ‘Stock Connect’ link to build up a single market for a wider range of 
investors. Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect was launched in 2014 to enable mutual market 
access by investors in the two markets through a controllable and expandable channel.576  
Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect would be also inaugurated by the end of 2016 to allow 
global investors access to the nation’s new economy, particularly in sectors such as IT, high-
end manufacturing and new materials, in contrast to the SHSE which is dominated by state-
owned banks and oil companies.  
 
Stock Connect allows mainland investors to buy Hong Kong-listed equities directly and waive 
the need for investment licenses for global investment funds looking to trade mainland shares. 
The scheme creates a single Chinese stock market that ranks as one of the three biggest in the 
world by market capitalisation and daily trading turnover. The move may help diversify the 
portfolios of Chinese investors, increase efficiencies for trading in Chinese companies that are 
dual-listed on both exchanges, and prompt rapid inclusion of Chinese stocks in global 
benchmark stock indices.577 It will also help to build Hong Kong into a comprehensive financial 
centre that can serve as an offshore wealth management centre for mainland investors, an 
offshore pricing centre for the Renminbi and global asset classes for the mainland.578 
 
Given that a number of equities are dual-listed in both Hong Kong and mainland China, a 
hurdle facing Stock Connect is a share price gap between the two markets.579 There are three 
share classes in China: A-shares (local Chinese companies denominated in RMB), B-shares 
(shares listed on mainland Chinese exchanges in foreign currencies) and H-shares (the shares 
of companies incorporated in mainland China that are traded in Hong Kong). Because H-
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shares are traded internationally and A-shares domestically, shares of the same company have 
often been traded at quite different price levels. At some times A-shares, because of the sheer 
scale of domestic demand, have been valued higher than H-shares, and at some times the other 
way around. As a consequence of investors directing their orders to the most attractively priced 
venue, price differences in dual-listed shares is likely to narrow as the programme develops. 
The average price gap in dual-listed stocks in both the mainland and Hong Kong has narrowed 
to 21 per cent from as much as 46 per cent.580  
 
5. Internationalisation of Stock Exchanges 
Traditional scholarship indicates that one of the most common reasons for companies to 
cross-list in reputational stock exchanges is to receive premium investor protection – the 
bonding hypothesis.581 However, there is a new trend of reverse cross-listing in the global 
capital markets, which runs in the opposite direction - companies from stronger perceived 
investor protection regimes, such as the US and UK, may still list in weaker perceived investor 
protection regimes, such as India or China. This type of cross-listing particularly exists in 
banking and financial services with high levels of customer or suppler trust, or manufacturing 
or restaurant services in which there is an urgent need to raise local currency finance where 
that currency is non- or partially-convertible.582   
 
To attract foreign investments, the CSRC and the SHSE prepared to establish an ‘International 
Board’, allowing qualified overseas companies to sell RMB-backed A shares to in Chinese 
domestic markets. It also would allow overseas-registered Chinese companies like China 
Mobile and Lenovo to list their shares in China. The promotion of the International Board, 
was officially and publicly announced by China’s State Council in the Opinions on Promoting 
Shanghai to Two Centers (Guo Fa No. 200919) and was listed as one of the seven most 
important working assignments of the CSRC. By attracting profitable companies from across 
the world to be listed on the SHSE, Chinese investors will be able to share the dividends 
derived from foreign listed companies and to expedite the internationalisation process of the 
RMB. But the launch of International Board has been still in the endless delay since 2009. The 
2013 announcement about the establishment of a new ‘China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade 
Zone’ led to a frenzy in China and abroad about that Zone being approved as the venue for the 
Shanghai’s international board, but it was subsequently denied by the CSRC and SHSE.583  
 
There are abundant issues resulting in the delay of the establishment of International Board. 
One of the biggest difficulties stems from the continued constraints on convertibility of the 
RMB on the capital account.584 A foreseeable challenge will be to cross-border exchange-traded 
funds, China depository receipts, and foreign enterprise secondary offerings because they are 
all restricted by China’s foreign exchange control. These restraints have operated since the 
very start of China's reform and opening to the outside world policy, and it appears that China 
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is moving inexorably towards the final elimination of those constraints. Next, some major legal 
problems must be tackled before the launch of the board as the current company law and 
securities law do not cover foreign companies, or overseas registered companies.585 Last but 
not least, how to coordinate the relationship with Hong Kong also affects the implementation 
of the international board. Presently RMB is nonconvertible and is limited by the A-share 
market, therefore international investors make investments in China through Hong Kong. The 
International Board will make Shanghai a financial centre for foreign investment, which may 
threaten Hong Kong’s status as a platform for foreign investors to circumvent Chinese 
regulations.586 
 
6. Conclusion – ‘One Country, One Market’ 
China has been counting on innovation and consumption to revive its slowing economy. 
Reform of the issuance system of new shares and lessening the investment and listing 
regulations for overseas issuers are at the core of China’s capital market development. The 
reform can enhance issuance efficiency, optimise resource allocation and open-up domestic 
markets for international investors.587 It is of great significance for the sound development and 
further improvement of the capital market. Analysts have predicted that acceleration of the 
stock market reform will further open-up and enhance the A-share market, which would result 
in China becoming a champion in the IPO market in 2016.588   
 
The Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect creates the second biggest stock market in the world, 
with a combined market capitalisation of over US$7 trillion and annual turnover of more than 
US$9 trillion.589 By adding the soon-launch of Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect and 
Shanghai’s International Board, China will further liberalise its capital account to 
international investors and build up a single Chinese market by consolidating the strengths of 
the three stock exchanges. The stock exchanges also will likely derive greater economies-of-
scale advantages from integration, both in their operations and in their trading of stock. On 
the operational side, integration can generate trading efficiencies by enhancing market 
liquidity and minimising market fragmentation.  
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